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aBsTracT
Entrepreneurship is a priority for governments worldwide and different 
studies have pointed out the importance of public governance to promote it. 
We used multilevel modelling on a sample of 206 countries for the period of 
2004 to 2014, to empirically test three hypotheses. Firstly, we tested whether 
creation of new businesses is partly determined by the supranational regions 
where the countries are located. Secondly, we estimated the immediate impact 
of governance on entrepreneurial rates, and thirdly, the delayed effect of 
governance was considered. Our results showed countries located in the same 
supranational region are more homogeneous in terms of entrepreneurship 
than countries situated in a different region. 
Keywords: business creation; governance; supranational region effect; 
multilevel analysis; international. 
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resuMen
El emprendimiento es una prioridad para los gobiernos en todo el mundo 
y numerosos estudios han señalado la importancia de la gobernanza para 
promover la creación de empresas. En este trabajo utilizamos una modelización 
multinivel sobre una muestra de 206 países, para el período 2004-2014, 
para probar empíricamente tres hipótesis. En primer lugar, verificamos si la 
creación de nuevas empresas está parcialmente determinada por las regiones 
supranacionales donde se encuentran los países. En segundo lugar, estimamos 
el impacto inmediato de la gobernanza en las tasas de creación de empresas 
y, en tercer lugar, se consideró el efecto retardado de la gobernanza. Nuestros 
resultados mostraron que los países ubicados en la misma región supranacional 
son más homogéneos en términos de emprendimiento que los países ubicados 
en una región diferente.
Palabras clave: creación de empresas; gobernanza; efecto región 
supranacional; análisis multinivel; internacional.
Clasificación JEL / JEL classification: M13; H00; G18; C23.
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1. inTroducTion 
The last few decades have brought economic, political and social changes, 
which have sparked the interest of academics, entrepreneurs and politicians, 
emphasising the role played by new business and companies in today´s societies. 
Many scientific studies have analysed in detail the effect of entrepreneurship 
in economic growth and employment (Anokhin et al., 2008; Klapper et al., 
2006; Minniti & Levesque, 2008; Naudé, 2010), innovation (Knoll & Zloczysty, 
2012), as well as their influence on the development and welfare of societies 
(Acs et al., 2008, Amorós & Bosma, 2013). According to Acs et al. (2008), 
entrepreneurship has a direct influence on economic performance, through new 
jobs, and the creation of new products and services, but also produces important 
indirect effects, primarily improving efficiency and productivity, reducing 
prices, stimulating structural transformation, and generating new markets 
and innovations. The economic impact of new businesses is not restricted to 
the sector in which it operates or to the region in which it is established. Thus, 
entrepreneurship produces positive externalities that spill over into other sectors 
and regions. This has allowed a greater understanding of the importance of 
business creation, considered by many authors as a strategic vector and a key 
element to design the most effective growth and development policies.
At the same time entrepreneurship has become more central, the term 
‘governance’ has recently become a key element in government and business 
policies. Governance is used to characterise the processes and institutions 
through which authority is exercised in a given country (Kaufmann et al., 2010; 
Ong, 2006). More specifically, governance is related to the process of selecting, 
monitoring and replacing governments, the effective capacity of governments to 
establish and perform structural policies, and the respect for national citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern (Kaufmann et al., 2010). In this 
context, good governance is synonymous with transparency, rule of law, efficient 
public services, and civil rights, among others (World Bank, 2013).
Despite the impact of public governance on economic growth and 
development, the relevance of this variable has been neglected by neoclassical 
growth theory. In the late 1980s, with the emergence of endogenous growth 
theories, public governance was recognised as a relevant component of 
economic growth. According to new growth theories, institutional structure is 
an important determinant of both transaction costs and production costs, 
good reason to believe that it may therefore affect economic growth (Aron, 
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2000). Consequently, improving the quality of public governance, countries 
can encourage domestic private investment and foreign direct investment by 
reducing business uncertainty, creating a suitable investment environment and 
actively contributing to economic growth.
This research aims to deepen the understanding of the determinants that 
underpin enterprise creation at a global scale. In particular, the focus of this 
work intends to analyse the role played by governance quality, understood as 
the capacity of a government and its public institutions to provide services and 
to design and implement norms.
From the entrepreneurship research point of view, the action of starting a 
business and its determinants have been a central question and a significant 
number of studies have analysed factors that influence entrepreneurship. 
Despite this, the literature on governance and business creation is scarce and/or 
has the potential to improve. This paper aims to fill this gap and also addresses 
other weaknesses in the literature.
Firstly, by using governance data, our study tests the hypothesis that 
the supranational regional contexts may partially determine levels of 
entrepreneurship, applying multilevel modelling. A multilevel and cross-national 
approach is linked to the recognised supportive public and institutional policies 
settings at country level in the development of firms. Therefore, the use of a 
multilevel approach provides both methodological and theoretical contributions 
and provides the opportunity of exploring the actual effect of government 
policies, taking into account the country differences. Secondly, we estimate the 
immediate and delayed impact of governance on entrepreneurial entry rates. 
An increasing amount of research has focused on a better understanding of the 
role of governance in the creation of new enterprises, but early research on this 
topic was primarily descriptive and lacking in longitudinal data. Here we use 
a three-level random intercept model and, to estimate the delayed effect of 
governance, the occasion-level variables are lagged by four periods. To the best 
of our knowledge no previous studies have done this.
In order to assure robustness, a large sample of over 200 countries have 
been used, including developed and developing economies, taking into account 
the set of measurements from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) research project (Kaufmann et al., 2010), translated into six governance 
variables for the 2004 to 2014 period. Panel data through multilevel analysis was 
performed for different estimation specifications. In methodological terms, to 
study the effects of governance quality in new business creation, contemporary 
and delayed perspectives are used in the multilevel panel approach. Given the 
lack of empirical evidence, the purpose of this research is to assess if a country´s 
location is a key factor or if the supranational region matters, filling an empirical 
research gap on the subject of entrepreneurship.
The remainder of this work is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces 
the literature review concerning the role of governance quality in new business 
creation. The next section describes the nature of the data and presents the 
variables and the sampling process. Section 4 describes the model specification, 
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while the following section presents the statistical results. The last section 
presents the main conclusions, highlights the most relevant aspects of this 
research, and establishes some future research lines.
2. liTeraTure review
Human behaviour is influenced by the institutional environment. There 
are reasons to believe that institutional factors may restrict or encourage the 
creation of new enterprises, influencing entrepreneurial environment (Ajzen, 
1991). In this context, several researchers have proposed the application 
of institutional factors to understand entrepreneurship (Alvarez et al., 2011; 
Salimath & Cullen, 2010; Thornton et al., 2011). At the same time, according 
to Acs et al. (2008) and Thai and Turkina (2014), entrepreneurship can play 
an important role in the introduction of structural changes in an economy, 
making it very useful for policymakers to understand how entrepreneurs drive 
factors when creating new businesses. Similarly, Wennekers et al. (2002) and 
Bjørnskov and Foss (2008) point out the importance of public governance to 
promote entrepreneurship.
Based on a literature review, Gedeon (2010) concludes that the observed 
rates of entrepreneurship across countries worldwide vary systematically. 
These differences are frequently linked to the nature and scale of formal and 
informal institutions. The identification of institutional obstacles in the creation 
of new businesses will contribute to a better understanding of the current 
situation, but will also help the development of political measures to stimulate 
entrepreneurship. The role played by formal institutions, such as explicit rules 
and regulations for the creation and the development of new companies, is 
extensively documented (Boettke & Coyne, 2009; Henrekson, 2007; Nystrom, 
2008; Van Stel et al., 2007).
Behaviour is also influenced by informal institutions, the so-called unwritten 
rules of the game (North, 1994), such as traditions, norms, values, codes 
of conduct, taboos, and other social mechanisms (Freytag & Thurik, 2007; 
Williamson, 2000). Numerous empirical studies have shown that informal 
institutions differ significantly across regions (Beugelsdijk, 2007; Bosma & 
Schutjens, 2011; Obschonka et al., 2013; Wagner & Sternberg, 2004). Such 
differences may then lead to more or less entrepreneurship-friendly policies at 
the regional level. 
Acs et al. (2008) found differences in the determinants of entrepreneurship 
between developed and developing countries. These differences are explained 
by different factors, including the institutional, such as macroeconomic 
stability, knowledge and public policies. Related to public policies, business 
entry may be influenced by public programmes and infrastructures. Public 
regulations also influence the choice between formal or informal sectors. In 
order to avoid bureaucracy, taxes, and market and labour regulations, most 
entrepreneurs operate informally (Gërxhani, 2004; Ghani et al., 2014), 
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especially in developing countries (Schneider et al., 2010). Finally, changes in 
the regulatory framework may have heterogeneous consequences, depending 
on the country (Aghion et al., 2005). 
Although some research studies found a statistical relationship between 
personality and personal attitudes of regional population and the level of 
new businesses, they have not deepened the interconnection of these effects, 
namely the role of public governance. 
Bettignies and Brander (2007) and McMillan and Woodruff (2002) argue 
that economic and institutional conditions are important determinants of 
entrepreneurship development. However, entrepreneurship development 
requires effective, sustained and long-term governance (Gugler & Chaisse, 
2009). By focusing on improving the quality of governance, governments can 
take on a variety of specific actions to promote entrepreneurship. However, for 
countries characterised by low levels of economic development, these actions 
may be ineffective, because their regulatory framework is generally weak (Thai 
& Turkina, 2014), which raises doubts about the ability of entrepreneurs to 
protect themselves from corruption. This situation may lead them to operate 
in informal sectors (Dreher & Schneider, 2010).
Numerous research studies have concluded that there is a positive 
relationship between the quality of governance and some indicators related 
to economic wellbeing, namely the United Nations Human Development 
Index (Rose-Ackerman, 2004), the growth of gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2003), and entrepreneurship activity (Amorós 
& Masferrer, 2010; Dau & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Grosanu et al., 2015; 
Kaufmann et al., 2006; Thai & Turkina, 2014). In turn, Klapper et al. (2007) 
concluded that the same type of relationship exists between good governance 
and entrepreneurship.
A common element of most of the work carried out on the effect of governance 
on entrepreneurship is the adoption of the so-called governance quality 
indicators, developed within the scope of the WGI project and disseminated by 
the World Bank. These indicators have been created by Kaufmann et al. (2010) 
and capture six key dimensions of governance: voice and accountability; 
political stability and absence of violence/terrorism; government effectiveness; 
regulatory quality; rule of law, and control of corruption. The research studies 
of Thai and Turkina (2014) and Klapper and Love (2010) are effective examples 
of this methodology. Thai and Turkina (2014) concluded that the impact of 
governance on entrepreneurship development is limited. Similarly, through 
a study about the relationship between several governance indicators and 
business creation (in the period 2004 to 2009), Klapper and Love (2010) 
concluded that none of these indicators showed statistical significance. 
According to them, this situation may be due to the fact that governance is a 
slow-moving variable, reason to believe that improvements in this variable are 
only observed over long time periods. The study considers a time frame of six 
years, which may be insufficient to record significant changes in governance 
quality indicators.
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Considering the empirical literature gap and the contradictory results from 
several studies, it seems that more investigation is needed, mainly by exploring 
new research issues, introducing new methodologies and extending the sample 
period in order to obtain more robust conclusions. Based on the analysis of the 
results obtained in previous studies, the following research hypotheses were 
defined:
H1: The supranational region determines the creation of new businesses.
H2: The various dimensions of governance determine the immediate 
creation of new businesses.
H3: The various dimensions of governance determine the deferred creation 
of new businesses.
3. The daTa and daMple
3.1. saMplinG process
The sample comes from the aggregation of two different databases of the 
World Bank. The World Bank’s Entrepreneurship Survey,1 containing annual 
information for 247 economies on the number of new companies registered 
for the period 2004 to 2014 was used to get data on entrepreneurial activity. 
The WGI2 database, which contain indicators of aggregate and individual 
governance for 215 economies biannually from 1996, and annually from 2002 
to 2014, was used to obtain governance data. These indicators are provided 
by the World Bank and calculated by Kaufmann et al. (2010), divided in six 
dimensions as mentioned above.
The final study sample was made up of countries only available in both 
databases (206), which removed some countries from the sample. In a similar 
way to Klapper and Love (2010), since we use up to four-year lagged values 
for independent and control variables as will be seen later, observations from 
2000 to 2014 were kept available for these explanatory variables. Meanwhile, 
for entrepreneurial activity we kept all available observations, from 2004 to 
2014. Table 1 summarises the sampling process.
1 The complete database is available at http://econ.worldbank.org/research/entrepreneurship. 
2 The complete database is available at www.govindicators.org.
TaBle 1. suMMary of saMplinG process
Database Countries Period Source
World Bank’s Entrepreneurship Survey 247 2004-2014 World Bank
Worldwide Governance Indicators 215 1996-2014 World Bank
Sample used in this study 206 2000/2004-2014
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3.2. definiTion of variaBles
As in Grosanu et al. (2015) and Klapper and Love (2010), this work measure 
entrepreneurship by the entry density of new companies (World Bank’s 
Entrepreneurship Survey). This indicator includes the number of new limited 
liability companies registered in the calendar year, per 1,000 people aged 
15 to 64 years, and we applied logarithmic transformation to this variable 
(Grosanu et al., 2015).
The six dimensions of governance or indicators of quality of governance of 
the WGI project are used by most of the previous works (Amoros & Masferrer, 
2010; Grosanu et al., 2015; Klapper & Love, 2010). These indicators have 
scores ranging between -2.5 and 2.5, the higher the scores, the better the 
results, and are defined as follows (Kaufmann et al., 2010):
• Control of Corruption (CC) captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites 
and private interests.
• Government Effectiveness (GE) captures perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies.
• Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV) measures 
perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-
motivated violence, including terrorism.
• Regulatory Quality (RQ) captures perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations 
that permit and promote private sector development. 
• Rule of Law (RL) captures perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in, and abide by, the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
• Voice and Accountability (VA) captures perceptions of the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media.
In this study, we incorporated the natural logarithm of GDP per capita based 
on purchasing power parity as the macroeconomic control variable. In this way, 
we ensure that the results are connected with a better business environment, 
rather than the overall level of development of the country (Klapper & Love, 
2010). Table 2 summarises the definitions of dependent, independent and 
control variables.
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4. Model specificaTion
We used multilevel modelling to empirically test the hypotheses proposed 
since the structure of the dataset contains occasion observations i (level 1) 
for each country j (level 2), located in each supranational region k (level 3) as 
shown in Figure 1.
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
DEPENDENT VARIABLE DENSITY




CC Control of Corruption
GE Government Effectiveness
PV Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism
RQ Regulatory Quality
RL Rule of Law
VA Voice and Accountability
CONTROL VARIABLE GDP Natural log of GDP per capita (PPP)
TaBle 2. definiTion of variaBles
fiGure 1. sTrucTure of daTa
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Firstly, we test whether entry density is partly determined by the 
supranational regions in which the countries are located (Hypothesis 1). Thus, 
the null hypothesis was tested that there are no supercluster effects (H0: σ2v 
= 0) by performing the LR test to compare a three-level occasions-within-
countries-within-region variance component model (Model 1) with a two-level 
occasions-within-countries variance component model (Model 2) (Leckie, 
2013; RabeHesketh & Skrondal, 2012): The three-level (Model 1) and two-
level (Model 2) models were written as:
DENSITYijk = β0 + vk + uj + eijk
[Model 1]
DENSITYij = β0 + uj + eij
[Model 2]
vk ~ N(0, σ
2
v)
uj ~ N(0, σ
2
u)
eijk ~ N(0, Ωe)
Where DENSITYijk is the observed entry density of new companies for 
occasion i in country j in supranational region k, β0 is the mean response 
across all occasions, vk is the effect of supranational region, uj is the effect 
of country j within supranational region k, and eijk is the residual error term.
 
The supranational region level (k) is not taken into account in Model 2.3 The 
likelihood ratio test (LR) 4 comparing the empty three-level model (Model 1) 
with the empty two-level model (Model 2) (Leckie, 2013).
LR = −2 lnL1 − (−2logL2)
Where L1 is the likelihood value for the two-level occasions-within-countries 
(Model 2), L2 is the likelihood value of the multilevel model (Model 1) and ‘ln’ 
refers to the natural logarithm.
To estimate the immediate impact of governance on entrepreneurial entry 
rates (Hypothesis 2), we extended the variance component model (Model 1) 
by adding the occasion-level governance variables (CC, GE, PV, RL, RQ, and VA) 
and the occasion-level control variable (GDP). The three-level random intercept 
model was written as:
3 The random effects are assumed to be independent of one another and normally distributed with 
zero means and constant variances. For the residual errors, it was assumed that they have a first-
order autoregressive correlation structure, AR (1) (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012; Steele, 2014). 
Under an AR (1) model var(eijk) = σ
2
e (constant) for all occasions i and cov(eijk, ei’jk) = σ
2
e ρ
|i − i’|, so 
corr(eijk, ei’jk) = ρ
|i − i’|. Thus, the correlation between the responses at occasions i and i’ depends on 
the length of time between them, and is smaller the further apart occasions i and i’ are (Steele, 2014).
4 As suggested by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012), it is divide the p-value by two for testing one 
variance when another uncorrelated random effect is in the model.
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DENSITYijk = β0 + β1 CCijk + β2 GEijk + β3 PVijk + β4 
RLijk + β5 RQijk + β6 VAijk+ β7 GDPijk + vk + uj + eijk
[Model 3]
To estimate the delayed effect of governance on entry density (Hypothesis 
3), the occasion-level variables are lagged four periods (t-4). The three-level 
lagged random intercept model was written as:
DENSITYijk = β0 + β1 CC(i-4)jk + β2 GE(i-4)jk + β3 PV(i-4)jk + 
β4 RL(i-4)jk + β5 RQ(i-4)jk + β6 VA(i-4)jk + β7 GDP(i-4)jk + vk 
+ uj + eijk
[Model 4]
5. eMpirical resulTs
This section aims to present an empirical contribution regarding the 
determinants of business creation. First, a descriptive analysis of all variables 
is conducted, followed by the empirical results, based on a multilevel panel 
approach.
5.1. descripTive analysis
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent and 
control variables.
TaBle 3. descripTive sTaTisTics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
DENSITY1 1,119 3.2448 4.737 0.002 44.130
CC 2,791 -0.0281 1.003 -1.924 2.586
GE 2,785 -0.0279 1.001 -2.480 2.430
PV 2,803 -0.0389 1.001 -3.324 1.938
RL 2,824 -0.0355 0.998 -2.669 2.121
RQ 2,784 -0.0286 0.998 -2.675 2.231
VA 2,826 -0.0297 1.003 -2.284 1.826
GDP1 2,615 15,455.080 18,597.410 405.483 140,649.200
Notes: 1 Variables are not in logs.
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On average, about three new companies were created annually per 1,000 
adults of working age in the period 2004 to 2014. However, the data show 
large disparities in entry density across regions (Figure 2).
Data by supranational region (Figure 2) shows that East Asia and Pacific 
has the highest entry density with an annual average of more than five (5.34) 
companies registered per 1,000 working age individuals. The supranational 
region with the lowest density is South Asia, where the annual average is less 
than one firm (0.56) per 1,000 individuals.
Table 3 also shows negative mean values for the six measures of governance 
over the period 2000 to 2014. The indicator with the highest average is 
Government Effectiveness (GE), with -0.0279, and the lowest is Political Stability 
and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV), with -0.0389. However, as with the 
dependent variable, governance indicators display important disparities across 
supranational regions (Figure 3).
North America, and Europe and Central Asia are the unique supranational 
regions with positive averages in all governance indicators (Figure 3). At the 
other end, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Middle East and North Africa 
show negative means for all measures of governance. East Asia and Pacific, and 
Latin America and Caribbean are in an intermediate situation with positive and 
negative average governance measures. Finally, the mean GDP per capita was 












Middle East & North Africa
Latin America & Caribbean
Europe & Central Asia
East Asia & Pacific
fiGure 2. averaGe enTry densiTy By supranaTional reGions (2004 To 2014)
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5.2. MulTivariaTe analysis
Table 4 shows the results of the estimations of the three-level model (Model 
1), the two-level model (Model 2) to entry density and the LR test.
fiGure 3. averaGe Governance Measures By reGions (2000 To 2014)
-6.00 -4.00 -2.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia
Middle East & North Africa
East Asia & Pacific
Latin America & Caribbean
Europe & Central Asia
North America
CC GE PV RL RQ VA







TaBle 4. Three and Two-level variance coMponenT Models and lr TesT
σ2e 2.224 2.839
ρ 0.981 0.985
Nº observations 1119 1119
Nº superclusters (Regions) 7
Nº clusters (Countries) 135 135
Log likelihood -467.387 -478.941
LR TEST (3-level to 2-level model)
χ2 23.110
p-value 0.000
p-value (divide by 2) 0.000
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The intercepts, which measure the overall mean of DENSITY across all 
occasions, all countries, and all supranational regions in Model 1, and across all 
occasions and all countries in Model 2, are not significant. The values for three- 
and two-level country random effects (σ2u) are very low. The value for the three-
level supranational region random effect (σ2v) is higher than the three-level 
country random effect (σ2u). The LR test rejects the null hypothesis that there 
are no supercluster effects (H0: σ2v = 0). Hence countries located in the same 
supranational region are more homogeneous in terms of entrepreneurship than 
countries situated in a different supranational region. This finding supports the 
hypothesis that supranational region context partly determines entry density 
(Hypothesis 1)5. These results are consistent with those of Beugelsdijk (2007), 
Bosma and Schutjens (2011) Obschonka et al. (2013), and Wagner and 
Sternberg (2004), who found that informal institutions differ significantly across 
regions. This heterogeneity may influence entrepreneurship-friendly policies 
at the region level more or less. These differences can be a consequence of 
the location of each country in its supranational regional context, integrated 
in a supranational region composed of developed or developing countries, 
translated into different institutional conditions, in line with the conclusions of 
Aghion et al. (2005), Carbonell (2005), and Ghani et al. (2014) and obtained 
from the existence of specific programmes to promote entrepreneurship, the 
creation of public regulation and legal changes, respectively.
The results of Models 3 and 4 are displayed in Table 5. Model 3 includes 
a random intercept and a set of governance and control explanatory variables 
on the occasion level (Level 1). Model 4 incorporates lags to the explanatory 
variables.
The results obtained for Model 3 (Table 5) show a significant immediate 
effect of Rule of Law (RL) and Regulatory Quality (RQ) on the creation of 
new businesses. With regard to Model 4, the results display a significant 
delayed effect of Control of Corruption (CC), Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence/Terrorism (PV), Rule of Law (RL), and Voice and Accountability (VA) 
on entrepreneurship. For the latter variables, the premise that governance is 
a slow-moving variable (Klapper & Love, 2010) is fulfilled. In both models, the 
control variable reports a significant positive effect. Thus, Hypotheses 2 and 3 
are validated for a set of governance explanatory variables.
Observing the sign of the different effects, the only measure of governance 
with a positive effect on entrepreneurship is Regulatory Quality (RQ). These 
results suggest that the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
pro-private sector development regulation and policies could stimulate 
5 In addition, by another LR test, we verified whether a multilevel model fits the data significantly 
better than a linear regression model without supercluster and cluster effects, that is, the null joint 
hypotheses that there are no higher level effects at all (H0: σ2v = 0, σ2u = 0) (Leckie, 2013). The 
results for three- and two-level models versus linear regression reject the null joint hypotheses. Hence 
using multilevel analysis is more appropriate than single-level analysis in this context.
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business creation. These results are consistent with those of Grosanu et al. 
(2015) and Klapper and Love (2010). 
Rule of Law (RL) exerts an immediate and delayed opposite influence. 
Thereby, qualities of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence, appear to have an 
immediate negative effect on company foundation, turning to positive over 
time. According to Klapper and Love (2010), governance indicators are slow-
moving variables so improvements in these indicators can only be observed 
over a longer time frame. Only after the Rule of Law (RL) measures effectiveness 
have reached a certain level, or after it is perceived by citizens in general, 
positive effects may occur.
Model 3 Model 4
  (without lag) (lag 4)
CONSTANT -9.244*** -6.779***
 (0.791)  (0.760)
FIXED EFFECTS
CC -0.089 -0.162*
 (0.074)  (0.068)
GE 0.000 -0.079
 (0.084)  (0.084)
PV 0.029 -0.108*
 (0.049)  (0.044)
RL -0.242* 0.204*
 (0.103)  (0.098)
RQ 0.268** 0.037
 (0.086)  (0.075)
VA 0.135 0.228**
 (0.080)  (0.075)
GDP 1.012*** 0.757***






Nº observations 1087 968
Nº superclusters (Regions) 7 7
Nº clusters (Countries) 132 131
Log likelihood -334.584 -405.283
TaBle 5. Three-level randoM inTercepT Model
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Continuing with the deferred effects, Voice and Accountability (VA) also 
has a positive delayed effect, while Control of Corruption (CC) and Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV) present a negative lagged 
influence on business creation. Thus, it appears that the ability to participate 
in the election of government, as well as having freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media, belatedly and positively influences 
entrepreneurship. However, the perception of the control of corruption and 
the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence could 
hurt future business creation. This apparent ambiguous negative effect may 
be explained by the argument of Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), according to 
which a higher level of corruption can be associated with greater amounts 
of public investments, especially in countries with a large public sector. 
Taking into account this argument, we can expect a certain level of trade-off 
between corruption control and investment climate. In turn, Dima et al. (2016) 
consider that this variable predisposes a complex problem with causes and 
consequences on entrepreneurship and development. Corruption may coexist 
with high economic performance, but it is a phenomenon that jeopardises the 
functioning of democratic institutions and contributes to a climate of political 
instability. In this sense, both variables report a strong linkage (Schumacher, 
2013). Thus, what has been said about the first variable may be applied, in 
part, to the second variable.
The lagged model (Model 4) results cannot be compared with any previous 
study since we are the first to analyse the effect of good governance on 
entrepreneurship in the past four years (four lags). The work could be similar 
to Klapper and Love (2010) although they are left with a delay of one lag and 
study variables governance in aggregate form.
6. resulTs, discussion and conclusions 
The focus on entrepreneurship and business creation is a high priority for 
many governments worldwide. Through the definition and implementation of 
public policies, public administrations can help encourage entrepreneurship, 
contributing to the promotion of economic growth and employment, to the rise 
of more dynamic and innovative economies and, above all, helping to improve 
the development and wellbeing levels of societies.
Specifically, this research focused its attention on the role played by 
governance on business creation. To develop the research, a multilevel panel 
data approach was applied, which in turn was performed on a sample of 206 
countries, for the period 2004 to 2014. This research took into account the 
World Bank’s Entrepreneurship Survey and the WGI database, in particular, the 
six dimensions of governance quality. 
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In order to understand the effect of governance quality on new business 
density, a triple perspective was adopted to accommodate three research 
hypotheses, particularly the supranational region effect, as well as both 
contemporary and delayed effects. 
Taking into account the likelihood ratio test, the null hypothesis that there 
are no supercluster effects was rejected. The first finding was that countries 
located in the same supranational region were more homogeneous in terms 
of entrepreneurship than countries situated in different supranational regions. 
This result partially supports the hypothesis that regional context influences 
entry density (Hypothesis 1). The level of influence varies across supranational 
regions, depending on their location. This finding implies important policy 
consequences, mainly that region-specific effects should be taken into account 
for entrepreneurship policymakers.
Therefore, as a first recommendation we indicate the need to keep and/
or build supranational structures that encourage policies to boost the 
creation of companies. In this sense, homogeneity in laws, taxes and subsidies 
can be helpful for entrepreneurship, but implementation of these policies 
from a transnational point of view is complicated. Therefore, governments 
must go further and check for other regulatory measures, for example, 
exchange programmes for students, entrepreneurs and/or investors, visas for 
entrepreneurs, and educational and training programmes. 
When the contemporary effect produced by different dimensions of 
governance on business creation is considered, it is possible to conclude that 
the only variables with statistical significance were Rule of Law and Regulatory 
Quality, although producing opposite sign effects, confirming partially the 
second hypothesis. The first variable had a negative impact, while the second 
had a positive effect. Thereby, the first variable, that captures the confidence 
in contract enforcement quality/capacity, property rights, the police and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence, has an immediate 
negative effect, while the second governance variable shows a positive effect, 
whereby entrepreneurs benefit from the government’s ability to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. In this sense, our recommendation is improving the 
quality of regulations through simpler regulatory frameworks. Entrepreneurs 
sometimes find the process to becoming an entrepreneur complex and long, 
therefore a clearer way to create a company can increase the perception of 
entrepreneurship as a viable option of work. 
By incorporating the lagged effect of the explanatory variables in the 
statistical model, the results registered substantial changes compared to the 
contemporary model, highlighting four statistically significant variables, namely 
Control of Corruption, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Rule of Law, 
and Voice and Accountability. Related to these results, some recommendations 
are anti-corruption laws with higher penalties, an easier and faster use of 
courts, mechanisms for citizens to participate in policies and influence political 
decisions, and developing alternative channels of communication. 
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Contrary to previous studies, such as Thai and Turkina (2014), that obtained 
results of limited impact of governance on entrepreneurship, or Klapper and 
Love (2010), with no statistical significance, our study found a relationship 
between some of the indicators of governance and entrepreneurship. One of 
the reasons for the different results can be that these studies considered a 
time frame of six years while ours covered 10 years and analysed the existence 
of delayed effects. 
Finally, considering the obtained results, two aspects should be highlighted. 
The first aspect relates to the fact that the first two variables helped to explain 
negative impacts on businesses creation, while the last two did so in a positive 
way. The negative sign of the first two variables can be explained from their 
intrinsic complexity. These variables are, in many situations, the cause and 
consequence of entrepreneurship, in such a way that they can coexist with 
high economic performance, usually associated with a large public sector, and 
in some cases, constitute a factor in attracting new business.
The second aspect results from the increase in statistically significant 
independent variables, with the incorporation of the deferred effect (Hypothesis 
3). This situation can be explained, in part, by what Klapper and Love (2010) 
designate as slow-moving variables, the effects of which are revealed mainly 
in the long term. Based on these results, it is possible to conclude that a 
commitment to improve governance as a promoter of new business creation, in 
dimensions such as Rule of Law and Voice and Accountability, does not depend 
on circumstantial decisions, but is rather a long-term strategic bet. 
From a government and policy point of view, our results show a supranational 
perspective is necessary as well as which factors related to governance have a 
more significant impact on entrepreneurship. International flows are changing 
at such an accentuated rate that governments have to develop specific policies 
and practices to support business creation according to other countries, so 
in the face of this reality, most countries are implementing new regulatory 
frameworks which are similar to their neighbours.
Our results show that governance has an effect on business creation, but 
entrepreneurship is not an ivory tower, there are multiple linkages between other 
economic and social fields with entrepreneurship and governance that must be 
consider. Therefore, we will increase awareness among researchers about the 
interrelation and impact of any governance. Models such as the quintuple helix 
(Carayannis & Campbell, 2010) visualise the collective interaction and exchange 
of knowledge through a circulation between societal subsystems.
This paper also presents some limitations that could open the way for 
further research. In particular, the six dimensions of governance of the WGI 
project were used, but other variables, such as ‘education level’, can be 
included to check links with entrepreneurship. Also, our main purpose was 
to evaluate the relations between governance and business creation using a 
regional perspective, but considering groups of countries, such as developed 
and developing countries, can offer another point of view. Finally, the number 
of regions considered are relative short.
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This paper provides evidence that the regional context has a significant 
role in supporting entrepreneurship, and different variables have an immediate 
and delayed impact of governance on entrepreneurial entry rates, but it is not 
free of limitations, which leave room for future research. Futures studies could 
create new subsamples of countries considering the degree of intervention of 
the governments in the economies and introducing new control variables.  
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